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A MATTER OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT: BRENTWOOD
AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE "PERVASIVE
ENTWINEMENT" TEST
"When the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional jurispru-
dence are thought of as reasons for decisions, rather than poetical
or mnemonic devices for formulating decisions reached on other
grounds, then [one]... is apt to forget the social forces which mold
the law."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment remains the great Rorschach test
of one's underlying jurisprudential beliefs. For those of a "pro-
gressive" bent, the amendment is a "sweeping mandate,"2 while
those more inclined toward powdered wigs and judicial formalism
criticize the amendment as an instrument of "freewheeling judi-
cial] lawmaking."3 It is a philosophical impasse, one that centers
around the apparently ambiguous prohibition against depriva-
1. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 809, 812 (1935).
2. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 32 (1980).
3. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 24 (1997).
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tions of due process and denials of equal protection.4 Unfortu-
nately, the strictures from the high court and Congress remain
equally ambiguous-particularly in the realm of state action.
Metaphors, such as "winks and nods,"5 "sifting facts and weighing
circumstances " ' and "under color of any statute,"7 guide the
analysis. The result is not merely a meandering precedent of in-
consistent verdicts,' but a serious epistemological quandary that
leaves one to wonder what values are to be assigned to "close
nexus" and "entwinement," and how future jurists should apply
such precedent.
In the United States Supreme Court's latest pronouncement of
the state action doctrine, Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Sec-
ondary School Athletic Ass'n,9 the Court stated that "[w]hat is
fairly attributable [to the state] is a matter of normative judg-
ment."' ° In so doing, the Court scored one for those of the "sweep-
ing mandate" persuasion by introducing the new metaphor of
"pervasive entwinement" into the state action lexicon." The test,
which relies on an ostensibly virgin judicial concept, emerged
from the "state nexus" litany of cases. This line of cases seeks to
identify a close relationship between state and private parties to
satisfy the "under color of state law" requirement of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 12 However, this proves a dubious jurisprudential
pedigree.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 301 (2001).
6. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
8. As Justice O'Connor noted in a dissenting opinion, "our cases,.. have not been a
model of consistency." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9. 531 U. S. 288 (2001).
10. Id. at 295.
11. Id. at 291.
12. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) ("In cases under § 1983, 'under
color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required
under the Fourteenth Amendment."). See generally Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Prima Facie
§ 1983 Case, in SWORD & SHIELD REVISITED: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 1, 2
(Mary Massaron Ross ed., 1998) ("Section 1983 is best understood as a federal statute that
creates a Fourteenth Amendment action for damages. Its functions include regulation of
official conduct and the compensation of persons suffering constitutional deprivations.")
Id.
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The purpose of this note is to identify the factors of the state
nexus prong, and illustrate how Brentwood expanded the scope of
the state action doctrine to include "pervasive entwinement." Part
II briefly examines the historical development of state action, the
nexus prong, and variations of nexus inquiry. Part III examines
the Brentwood decision and the test of "pervasive entwinement."
Part IV flirts with a formalist reading of Brentwood, illustrating
first that "pervasive entwinement" is little more than a camou-
flage for a less-restrictive "symbiosis" test. Part V scrutinizes the
semantic ambiguity of the Court's usage of metaphors, concluding
that such ambiguity sufficiently muddies the inquiry so as to li-
cense judicial invention. Of course, what that invention entails
remains "a matter of normative judgment." 3
II. THE BIRTH OF STATE ACTION AND THE NEXUS FACTOR
A. "In all fairness"
The Civil Rights Cases4 of 1883 held that protections afforded
by the Fourteenth Amendment applied solely to states. 5 How-
ever, in Smith v. Allwright,6 the Supreme Court expanded the
scope of the amendment to include private actors who engage in
government functions. This determination (whether private acts
may constitute state action) has since evolved into the judicially-
constructed state action doctrine. The doctrine "explores the 'es-
sential dichotomy' between the private sphere and the public
sphere, with all its attendant constitutional obligations."" The
extent to which private entities implicate the attendant obliga-
tions of the doctrine depend primarily on their relationship with
state actors. 9
13. Brentwood, 531 U. S. at 295.
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15. Id. at 11 ("It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.").
16. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
17. See JoHNE. NOWAK& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONST1TUIONAL LAW § 12.1, 502-03
(6th ed. 2000).
18. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (citing Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irris, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972)).
19. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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Until the 1980s, the Supreme Court conducted its state action
inquiry with a two-part disjunctive analysis: (1) whether the pri-
vate entity performed a traditional government function; or (2)
whether the circumstances "entangled" the private entity with
the state.2 ° In 1982, however, the Court in Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co.2' recast the issue with broader scope. The Court's primary
inquiry hinged on whether the conduct may be fairly character-
ized as state action.22 Therefore, the Court left future courts with
the responsibility of shaping criteria for state action by "re-
stat[ing] the state action question in general terms."23
Later decisions in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.24 and
Georgia v. McCollum 25 identified three basic factors to be consid-
ered in the determination of whether private acts could be de-
scribed "in all fairness" as state action: (1) whether the private
act involved a traditional government function; (2) whether the
private actors received government assistance and benefits; and
(3) whether the injury was "aggravated in a unique way by the
incidence of government authority."26 Somewhat surreptitiously,
the Brentwood Court later included another factor: whether the
government was "entwined in [the] management or control" of the
private entity.27 Nevertheless, the Court's precarious judicial nov-
elty may be partly forgiven on the grounds that courts typically
construe the factors under the pre-Lugar dichotomy.2 Thus, fac-
tors two and three are subsumed under the generic title of "state
nexus," and judges pose a series of rationales to bridge state and
private action. These rationales include coercive power and sig-
20. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, §12.1 at 505-06.
21. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
22. Id. at 924; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, §12.1 at 504. As the au-
thors admit, courts typically utilize the issue as the second part of a two-part test. In cases
such as Edmonson, courts determine first whether the injury resulted from the exercise of
a right or privilege having its source in state authority. The authors criticize this first in-
quiry as "of little practical importance," as "it is unlikely that the private actor will be sub-
ject to a suit that centers on whether he had state action when he caused the harm." Id.
23. G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The
Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 Hous. L. REV. 333, 354 (1997).
24. 500 U.S. 614(1991).
25. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
26. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, §12.1, at 505.
27. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966)).
28. Buchanan, supra note 23, at 354.
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nificant encouragement, joint action, agency control, symbiosis
and entwinement.29
B. Metaphorically Speaking: The Criteria for Determining
Whether a Nexus Exists
While the determination of whether a private actor has per-
formed a public function may be "easily justified,"" justification
in state nexus cases takes on an amorphous, metaphorical qual-
ity. The Court personifies close relationships between actors with
phrases that re-emerge in distinguishable contexts throughout
the cases. The state nexus cases cited by Brentwood evidence sub-
tle distinctions between the theories.3'
1. Coercive Power and Significant Encouragement
In Blum v. Yaretsky,32 the Court determined that a state may
be liable for the actions of a private party where the state "has
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encour-
agement."33 While either overt or covert coercion is sufficient,
mere approval or acquiescence is not. 4 Though the Blum Court
concluded that no such coercion existed where a nursing facility
received state-channeled Medicaid funds, the case solidified the
viability of the doctrine.35
The facts of Blum illustrate what would have been sufficient to
find coercive power. The plaintiffs argued that the state "affirma-
tively command[ed]" private nursing facilities to transfer and dis-
charge residents.36 In support of this claim, the plaintiffs pointed
to a state-required form which physicians used to assess the
29. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296; see also id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
30. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, §12.2, at 510.
31. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42 (1988); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Pennsylvania
v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (per curiam).
32. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
33. Id. at 1004.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1008.
36. Id. at 1005.
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medical needs of applicants.37 Individuals who did not necessitate
"4more extensive care" according to the form's criteria were denied
access to "skilled nursing facilities" ("SNF") The Court pointed
out that the form did not pertain to discharges and transfers, but
admittance into the SNF. Consequently, the Court held that the
physician's discretion-and not the state requirement-
determined the success of the applicant.39
Next, the plaintiffs argued that state regulations "impose[d] a
range of penalties on nursing homes that fail to discharge or
transfer patients whose continued stay [was] inappropriate." °
The statutes mandated that care providers serving patients "sub-
stantially in excess" of the need be excluded from its program,
and also imposed fines on facilities that did not abide by regula-
tions.4 Again, the Court found that the regulations had nothing
to do with the facility's decision to deny service.42 After rejecting
the plaintiffs' contention that the private facilities acted jointly
with the state and that the nursing homes conducted a public
function, the Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove state
coercion sufficient to merit a Fourteenth Amendment violation.43
Thus, had the forms or regulations left doctors with no alterna-
tive but to reject the patients, the state would have exercised co-
ercive power.
2. Joint Action
The Brentwood Court also listed "joint participation" as a factor
that could lead to state action.' This facet of state nexus bridges
the gap between private and state actors by finding the private
actor to be a "willful participant in joint activity with the State or
its agents."45 In joint action cases, the private entity typically re-
lies on the incidence of government authority to complete a dis-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 994. Denied applicants could still receive "less extensive, and generally less
expensive" care in a "health related facility." Id.
39. Id. at 1006-08.
40. Id. at 1009.
41. Id. at 1010 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 420.101(a)(2) (1981)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1012.
44. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296.
45. Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982)).
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criminatory act.46 Such was the case in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co.47 In Lugar, a creditor successfully retained a prejudgment
writ of attachment against the debtor's property." The debtor
brought suit against the creditor under § 1983 alleging a violation
of due process.49 The debtor claimed, and the Court agreed, that
his reliance on procedures created by the state constituted joint
activity sufficient to confer state authority on the private actor.5"
Joint action is differentiated (subtly) from coercion in that state
actors, acting in their capacity as state actors, perform the ac-
tions that cause the constitutional deprivation at the behest of
private parties." The private participant need only act willfully to
set the acts in motion. 2 Coercion, however, encourages private
actors to perform the acts. " Other factors include the common
goals of the state and private entities, the pressure that the pri-
vate actor exerted over the state actor, and whether the state ac-
tively participated in the alleged discrimination."
3. Agency Control
Quite simply, a nominally private actor that is controlled by an
agency of the state may be considered a state actor.55 In Pennsyl-
vania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts,56 the Court employed
the approach in a concise and decidedly un-metaphorical syllo-
gism: "The Board which operates Girard College is an agency of
the State of Pennsylvania. Therefore, even though the Board was
46. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that the Constitution
prohibits criminal defendants from purposefully using pre-emptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding
that the Constitution prohibits private litigants in civil cases from using pre-emptory chal-
lenges in a racially discriminatory manner).
47. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
48. Id. at 924.
49. Id. at 925.
50. Id. at 941-42.
5L Compare id. at 942 (holding that court procedures caused the constitutional depri-
vation), with Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1006-08 (1982) (analyzing whether the state
form caused private doctors to make health care decisions).
52. Buchanan, supra note 23, at 421.
53. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
54. Buchanan, supra note 23, at 421. The commentator lists factors that may lead to
an "intelligent resolution" of the joint action issue.
55. Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (per curiam).
56. 353 U.S. 230.
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acting as a trustee, its refusal to admit [appellants] to the college
because they were Negroes was discrimination by the State."57
Perhaps a more illuminating example of the agency control
theory of state nexus is Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak.58 In
Pollak, passengers of Capitol Transit's streetcars grew perturbed
with the music of the car's newly installed radios. 9 When man-
agement ignored their complaints, the passengers sought judicial
redress.6" Since the streetcar company was a federally-regulated
monopoly in the District of Columbia, the passengers looked to
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.6'
The Court considered the plaintiffs' due process complaint,
finding "a sufficiently close relation between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the radio service."62 In doing so, the Court expressly
avoided the public function doctrine, relying instead on Capitol
Transit's relationship with the Commission. The Court stated:
"[w]e rely particularly upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to
protests against the radio program, ordered an investigation of it
and, after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation dis-
missed on the ground that the public safety, comfort, and conven-
ience were not impaired thereby."64 The Court concluded that the
agency's close relationship with the private company constituted
a sufficient relationship to justify the imposition of the due proc-
ess claim.65
4. Symbiosis
The dissent in Brentwood stated that "[u]ntil today, we have
found a private organization's acts to constitute state action only
when the organization performed a public function; was created,
57. Id. at 231.
58. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
59. Id. at 456.
60. Id. at 456-57.
61. Id. at 461-62.
62. Id. at 462.
63. Id. at 462. ("In finding this relation we do not rely on the mere fact that Capital
Transit operates a public utility.... Nor do we rely upon the fact that, by reason of such
federal authorization, Capital Transit now enjoys a substantial monopoly of street railway
and bus transportation.").
64. Id.
65. Id. at 462-63.
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coerced, or encouraged by the government; or acted in a symbiotic
relationship with the government."6 Although the majority in
Brentwood neglected to include this symbiotic relationship factor,
its legitimacy is evidenced by the Court's continued reliance on
"symbiotic relationships."" Sometimes restated as a "multiple or
joint contacts" analysis," private/state symbiosis relies on a sys-
tem of "benefits mutually conferred" on both parties, where the
state is "integral" to the existence of the private entity.69 Unlike
the nexus cases where the action sprang from the relationship of
the parties, the action in symbiosis is incidental to the relation-
ship; thus, the state is constructively liable. °
In "[t]he classic 'joint-contact-symbiotic relationship' case," 1
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,72 a restaurant located
inside a Delaware-owned parking garage refused to serve an Afri-
can-American patron solely because of his ethnicity. 3 The patron
brought suit under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging a denial
of equal protection.74 By "sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances," the Court undertook a detailed analysis of the contacts
between the shop and the state, including the public ownership of
the facility, the restaurant's leasehold interest in the property,
the shop's integral relationship with the rest of the parking ga-
rage, and the public maintenance of the facility.75 The Court de-
termined that both parties benefited from the arrangements. 6
First, "the commercially leased areas.., constituted a physically
and financially integral and, indeed, indispensable part of the
State's plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit."7 Fur-
66. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 305 (2001)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
67. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (rejecting the idea of a sym-
biotic relationship between a state and private school because of a fiscal relationship);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding a leasor/leasee rela-
tionship sufficient to subject the private actor to constitutional restraints).
68. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, § 12.4(b), at 531.
69. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
70. Id. at 725 (describing the State's "insinuat[ion]" into a "position of interdepend-
ence.").
71. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, § 12.4(b), at 532.
72. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
73. Id. at 716.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 722-25.
76. Id. at 724.
77. Id. at 723-24.
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thermore, proceeds of rental and parking services conferred sub-
stantial benefit upon the state.78 Reciprocally, the restaurant re-
ceived the benefit of the facility, parking and an assurance that
"there [was] no possibility of increased taxes."79 Given the mutu-
ality, the Court found the discrimination an "irony amounting to
grave injustice." °8
Thus, the prevailing feature of the symbiotic relationship
analysis is the mutual dependency of the actors." Furthermore,
the existence of the private entity is predicated on the existence
of the state. 2 Burton illustrates the literal manifestation of this
relationship-where a private entity is physically attached to the
state building-providing and receiving benefits such that the ac-
tions of the coffee shop may be said to be the actions of the state.'
5. Entwinement?
The Court in Brentwood stated that "a challenged activity may
be state action when... it is 'entwined with governmental poli-
cies' or when government is 'entwined in [its] management or
control." 4 Without expressly defining "entwinement," the Court
relied on Evans v. Newton, 5 which held that where a "tradition of
municipal control had become firmly established," a city cannot
circumvent the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment by trans-
ferring ownership to a trustee. 6 Therefore, a city could not simply
transfer a public park to private owners in order to maintain dis-
criminatory policies.8
78. Id. at 723.
79. Id. at 724.
80. Id.
81. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, § 12.4(b), at 533 ("When the activities of the
government and private actor become so intertwined for their mutual benefit, the private
party has no basis for complaint when his decisions are subjected to constitutional limita-
tions in the same manner as those of the government.").
82. Id.
83. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-24.
84. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)
(citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-301 (1966)).
85. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
86. Id. at 301.
87. Id. at 301-02.
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The Court in Evans cited three factors that "entwined" the city
in the management and control of the park.8" The Court found
that the park (1) "was an integral part of the City of Macon's ac-
tivities;"89 (2) "was swept, manicured, watered, patrolled and
maintained by the city;""0 and (3) acquired the momentum of
state control from the city's past ownership.9'
The public function branch of the state action doctrine also in-
fluenced the Court, which likened the park's character to that of
the "fire department or police department ... municipal in na-
ture."92
Perhaps motivated by the blatant end-around of the Georgia
Supreme Court, the Court did not examine the private and public
contacts with the precision required by Burton. Nevertheless, the
Court's first and second factors clearly echoed the Burton fac-
tors.93 Both Courts found significance in the integral role of the
private actor in the state or state activity, and in the state's
maintenance of the private facility.94 For the third factor, the
Court employed the metaphor of "momentum" as a means to un-
dermine the legitimacy of the transaction.95 The Court stated that
"[t]he momentum it acquired as a public facility is certainly not
dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of 'private' trustees."96
Thus, absent Evans's somewhat questionable import of state
momentum, the same factors that dictated the existence of a state
nexus in Burton also entwined the parties in Evans.97 Yet the
Court did not address symbiosis, perhaps because of the concep-
tual problems the metaphor presented. While the Court charac-
terized the park as integral to the city's activities, this impor-
tance may not rise to the physically integral relationship of




92. Id. at 302.
93. Compare id. at 301 (citing the "integral" relationship and city maintenance), with
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (citing the "integral relationship"
and other "arrangements").
94. See supra note 93.
95. Evans, 382 U.S. at 301.
96. Id.
97. See supra note 93.
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Burton.9 Furthermore, the notion that park maintenance may
satisfy the city's sole benefit to the trustees may not be persua-
sive. Clearly, the more utilitarian justification-momentum-
outweighed the significance of entwinement.
The Evans Court's reliance on Pennsylvania v. Board of Direc-
tors of City Trusts is an "obvious example" of private conduct en-
twined with government policy.99 As evidenced by the brief opin-
ion in Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, however,
that Court relied on an agency theory of state action to impose
state status on college trustees.' 0 In Evans, momentum attrib-
uted agency status upon the new private class of trustees.' '
Thus, Evans does not make apparent entwinement's viability as
an independent criterion for state action. Rather, entwinement
merely provided a literary description of something akin to sym-
biosis and agency.
C. Just a Footnote
One case that illuminated issues unique to nominally private
athletic associations, and thus foreshadowed Brentwood, is Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian.'°2 In Tarkanian, the
NCAA investigated the University of Nevada Las Vegas
("UNLV") and basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian for alleged re-
cruiting violations. 3 The investigation culminated in four days of
hearings, after which the NCAA found Tarkanian guilty of ten
violations.' 4 The NCAA subsequently placed UNLV on probation
and ordered the state-funded public school to show cause why
Tarkanian should not be removed from the program.'0 ' Though
UNLV disagreed with the findings of the investigation, the school
abided by the NCAA's recommendations and removed Tar-
kanian.' Tarkanian fired back, however, with a § 1983 suit
98. In Burton, the leasehold estate was located in a state building. Burton, 365 U.S. at
716.
99. Evans, 382 U.S. at 299.
100. Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (per curiam).
101. Evans, 382 U.S. at 299.
102. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
103. Id. at 185.
104. Id. at 185-86.
105. Id. at 186.
106. Id. at 186-87. The NCAA presented UNLV with three options: (1) retain Tar-
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against UNLV and the NCAA, in which he alleged due process
violations. °7 Specifically, Tarkanian claimed that UNLV dele-
gated its rulemaking function to the NCAA, making the NCAA a
state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The Court framed the issue differently, however. While it ac-
knowledged that the publicly-funded UNLV was "without ques-
tion "1 9 a state actor, the Court determined that UNLV's termina-
tion was secondary to the source of the sanctions-the NCAA." 0
"[Sltep[ping] through [an] analytical looking glass," the Court de-
termined that Tarkanian posed a mirror image of traditional
nexus analysis."' Rather than determining whether state status
may be attributed to private actors, the Court addressed the issue
of whether state actors altered the nature of private conduct to
encompass state action."2 That is, whether UNLV's removal
turned the NCAA's enforcement proceedings into state action."'
Despite the inverted fact-pattern, the Court followed the state
nexus template of analysis by examining the relationship be-
tween the NCAA and the state of Nevada."' Since over 960
schools from across the United States participated in the NCAA,
the Court characterized UNLV's role in policymaking as minor."'
The Court noted that UNLV failed to adopt non-NCAA standards
or amend existing standards."6
Further, the Court rejected Tarkanian's contention that UNLV
delegated powers to the NCAA, and that the two acted as part-
ners." The facts indicated that "the NCAA and UNLV acted
much more like adversaries than like partners" throughout the
investigation, as evidenced by the school's reluctance to terminate
kanian and risk heavier sanctions; (2) remove Tarkanian; or (3) pull out of the NCAA. Id.
at 187.
107. Id. at 187.
108. Id. at 192.
109. Id.






116. Id. at 194-95.
117. Id. at 195-96.
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Tarkanian."8 Clearly, then, the parties did not willfully engage in
state action to attain mutual goals." 9 The Court gave a cursory
glance dismissing Tarkanian's assertion that the NCAA's power
to discipline was so great that the state had no choice but to com-
ply. 120 The Court then ruled that UINLV acted under NCAA pol-
icy-not state law.'2 ' Similarly, the Court rejected the contention
that the regulation of interscholastic sports is a "traditional pub-
lic function."'22 Thus, the Court found the nexus insufficient to
support the § 1983 claim. 23
Tarkanian altered the traditional approach to nexus analysis
in two ways. First, the case demonstrated the significance of
commonality of interests. The Court cited the divergent goals of
the two actors in response to both the joint activity and delegated
authority arguments.'24 Second, the Court employed a slight deri-
vation of traditional coercion to accommodate the different fact
pattern. While the state would typically serve as the coercive
party furthering private action, in Tarkanian the private entity's
regulations prompted the action.'25
While these two modifications emerged again in Brentwood,
another element of the Tarkanian decision provided a more sali-
ent justification for finding state action in a slightly different con-
text: "The situation would, of course, be different if the member-
ship consisted entirely of institutions located within the same
State, many of them public institutions created by the same sov-
ereign."'26 In Brentwood the situation was, of course, different.
118. Id. at 196.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 198-99.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 197-98 n.18.
123. Id. at 199.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 192-93.
126. Id. at 193 n.13.
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III. BRENTWOOD: A PERSONAL FOUL TRIGGERS STATE ACTION
A. Similar Violations, Different Results
In 1997, the Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Association
("Association") conducted an investigation of recruitment policies
at Brentwood Academy, a private college-preparatory school.127
The Association had received three initial complaints: (1) that the
Brentwood Academy football coach provided free game tickets to
a middle school coach and two students; (2) that the coach con-
tacted students from other schools who had previously signed
agreements to attend Brentwood and encouraged them to attend
spring football practice; and (3) that the basketball coach con-
ducted an off-season practice in violation of Association policy.128
On July 29, 1997, the Executive Director of the Association,
Ronnie Carter, informed Brentwood Academy that the Associa-
tion found six violations of its rules. 29 In conformance with the
Association's two-step appellate procedure, Brentwood appealed
the decision twice. 3 ° As a consequence of the second appeal, the
Board of Control-composed solely of public high school princi-
pals-reduced the number of violations to three.' The Board im-
posed five penalties on Brentwood, including a four-year proba-
tion, a suspension from participation in the next two playoff
seasons, and a $3,000 fine. 2
Having exhausted the Association's administrative appeals,
Brentwood Academy filed a § 1983 action on December 12,
1997.13' The complaint alleged that the Association's sanctions
violated Brentwood's right to free speech, substantive and proce-
dural due process rights, as well as other state and antitrust
claims. 34 In the district court proceeding, the court found that the
Association's dependence on public school systems evidenced a
127. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Schs. Athletic Ass'n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675
(M.D. Tenn. 1998).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 676.
130. Id. at 677.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 677-78.
133. Id. at 678.
134. Id.
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symbiotic relationship with the state. 135 Further, the court noted
that the close identification between the state's traditional func-
tion of education and the Association's extracurricular function
forged a sufficient nexus.13' As a consequence, the court proceeded
with the remaining claims and granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of Brentwood Academy under the First Amendment claim.
137
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, examin-
ing the facts under the public function, state compulsion, and
symbiotic relationship tests.138 The court first dispensed with the
public function test by relying on San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,"9 stating that "neither
the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a
traditional government function."4 ' Second, the court determined
that minimal interaction between the state and the Association
warranted a finding that the state had exerted compulsion upon
the Association to act in a certain manner.'4 ' Under the symbiotic
relationship test, the court distinguished between two previous
Sixth Circuit cases that found another high school athletic asso-
ciation to be a state actor.' In Yellow Springs v. Ohio High
School Athletic Ass'n,' the court held that a symbiotic relation-
ship existed between a state athletic association and Ohio."4
However, since the case concentrated on Title IX rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Brentwood court disregarded the
precedent as dicta.'45 Similarly the Sixth Circuit distinguished
Alerding v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n,"'46 which held the
Ohio High School Athletic Association ("OHSAA") subject to state
status on the grounds that the state had implicitly delegated its
authority. 7 The Brentwood court found this argument unper-
135. Id. at 685.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 694.
138. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Schs. Athletic Ass'n, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir.
1999).
139. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
140. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 763 (quoting San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987)).
141. Id. at 764.
142. Id.
143. 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981).
144. Id. at 653.
145. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 765.
146. 779 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1985).
147. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 765 (citing Alerding v. Ohio Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 779 F.2d
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suasive, given the state's legislated disassociation with the
appellant.
148
B. Entwinement: A New Extension of an Old Metaphor
Upon review, the United States Supreme Court declared the
state action doctrine "a matter of normative judgment."49 With
that, the Court broke from the rigid simplicity of precedent and
identified "a host of facts" that "bear on the fairness" of attribut-
ing state action to a private entity.' 50 These factors include the
state's "coercive power" or "significant encouragement," a state
agency's control over a nominally private entity, a state's delega-
tion of powers, a private actor's "willful participation in joint ac-
tivity," and lastly, the "entwined" nature of private policies or
state controls.'5 '
According to the Court, four cases framed the inquiry.'52 In
Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 3 the Court attrib-
uted state status to Amtrak, which the Brentwood Court ac-
knowledged "was organized under federal law to attain govern-
mental objectives, and was directed and controlled by federal
appointees."' Similarly, in Board of Directors of City Trusts, a
private college was held to be a state actor because the college's
board of directors was established by state law. 5 Along with Ev-
ans, the Court, without elaboration, found the cases significant in
light of the Association's past relationship with the state of Ten-
nessee, determining that the decisions foreshadowed the case at
bar.'56 Also, the Court noted that Tarkanian anticipated the
Brentwood scenario, and pointed toward a finding of state ac-
tion."' While the "strict holding" of Tarkanian did not resolve
315, 316 n.1 ("OHSAA is a state actor for purposes of § 1983 because Ohio has implicitly
delegated to OHSAA its power to regulate and organize interscholastic athletic activi-
ties.")).
148. Id. at 765-66.
149. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).
150. Id at 296.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
154. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296.
155. Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (per curiam).
156. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 297.
157. Id. at 298.
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Brentwood, the majority found dicta in the 1988 decision persua-
sive.15 The Court harkened back to a footnote in Tarkanian'59
that would have resolved the issue for the Court, finding that
when most of the public schools existed within the state, state ac-
tion would be found.
60
Illustrating the state-like character of the Association, the
Court acknowledged that the Association was a private not-for-
profit membership corporation that regulated athletic events for
290 public high schools and 55 private schools. 6' Unlike the
NCAA, each member school resided within the confines of the
same state, with public schools comprising eighty-four percent of
the Association's voting membership. 162 Furthermore, the Court
noted that statutory language that had once bound the Associa-
tion to the state was dropped by the Board in 1996.163 Thereafter,
the state authorized public schools to maintain strictly voluntary
membership.
64
The Court employed two distinct inquiries to determine the ex-
istence of entwinement. 6 5 First, the Court examined the relation-
ship between the private actor and the state "from the bottom
up.""'6 This approach analyzed the composition of the Associa-
tion's membership. For the Court, this examination resembled a
numbers game: because public schools comprised eighty-four per-
cent of the Association's membership, the Association would fail
to exist without public control. 67 Second, the Court took a "top
down" approach, examining the administrative personnel and
procedures. 16 The Court identified three relevant facts: (1) State
Board members sat in a non-voting capacity on the Association's
158. Id.
159. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
160. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298.
161. Id. at 299.
162. Id.
163. Id at 292.
164. Id. at 293.
165. Id. at 299-300.
166. Id. at 299.
167. Id. at 299-300. "There would be no recognizable Association, legal or tangible,
without the public school officials, who do not merely control but overwhelmingly perform
all but the purely ministerial acts by which the Association exists and functions in practi-
cal terms." Id. at 300.
168. Id. at 300-02.
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board;69 (2) Association employees remained eligible for state re-
tirement benefits; 7 ° and (3) the close relationship failed to dissi-
pate after the state formally severed ties with the Association.'
The Court also noted that the close relationship was evidenced by
the Association's continued enforcement of pre-1996 rules and the
State Board's continued willingness to permit students to satisfy
education requirements by participation in Association-sponsored
athletic activities. 72
Though the Association addressed each of the recognized state
action criteria in its brief, only two of its arguments received
treatment in the opinion. 7 ' First, the Court addressed the public
function test.74 While the Association argued that the supervision
and regulation of interscholastic athletic activities "are [not] tra-
ditionally and exclusively reserved to the state,"'75 the Court as-
sumed that it did not constitute a public function.'76 Nevertheless,
the Court dismissed the argument, stating matter-of-factly that
"this case does not turn on' the public function test."'7 7 Similarly,
the Court found that the state coercion criterion of state nexus
analysis did not apply.77 Noting the fact-sensitive nature of the
inquiry, the Court found that "no one criterion must necessarily
be applied." 79 Therefore, where the parties are entwined "to the
point of largely overlapping identity,"8 0 a different test need not
be consulted absent a countervailing value.' The Court found no
such countervailing value.8 2
169. Id. at 301.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 301-02.
173. Respondent's Brief, Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531
U.S. 288 (2001) (No. 99-901).
174. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 302.
175. Respondent's Brief at 16, Brentwood (No. 99-901).
176. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 302.




181. Id. at 304.
182. Id. The Association argued that holding the private athletic association liable as a
state actor would trigger "unprecedented federal litigation" and would be unnecessary
since public schools were already treated as state actors. The Court was not persuaded,
finding that "the record raises no reason for alarm" as to the former, and the public
school's responsibility as state actors has nothing to do with the Association's status as a
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C. The Dissent: A Reproach of Judicial Invention
In his dissent, Justice Thomas took two divergent paths of
analysis.8 3 First, Justice Thomas applied a "common sense" ap-
proach. l 4 In this strictly fact-based inquiry, Justice Thomas
found four factors indicating that the complained action failed to
meet the § 1983 requirements.'85 The factors included the Asso-
ciation's formation as a private organization, the voluntary na-
ture of public school participation, the Association's self-rule and
its largely self-financed operating budget.'86 Second, Justice Tho-
mas referenced three specific factors of modern state action
analysis. He found that the Association did not serve a traditional
public function,8 7 the state lacked coercive power over the Asso-
ciation, 8 and no symbiotic relationship existed between the two
entities. 8 9
Justice Thomas further criticized the majority's methodology.
The dissent found fault with the "new theory,"' 90 fearing the
vague language and questionable precedential authority would
lead to unwarranted extension of § 1983 claims to organizations
composed of public officials. 9 ' Justice Thomas took issue with the
semantics of entwinement, noting that the word only appeared in
one of the majority's relied-upon precedents.'92 Because of the ju-
dicial novelty of the majority's rationale, Justice Thomas argued,
properly named defendant. Id.
183. Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy.
184. Id. at 306 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 306-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 309 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated that "[t]he organization
of interscholastic sports is neither a traditional nor an exclusive public function." Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 310 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, public schools do provide a small
portion of the TSSAA's funding through their membership dues, but no one argues that
these dues are somehow conditioned on the TSSAA's enactment and enforcement of re-
cruiting rules.").
189. Id. at 311 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent analogized the fiscal relationship
between the parties as "not different from" government and contractor. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982)).
190. Id. at 312 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 314-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 312 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that the Court in Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), used the word "entwined," but not as a "distinct concept."
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the scope of the majority's holding was unclear and therefore sub-
ject to the normative judgment of future decision-makers.193 Jus-
tice Thomas thus claimed that the "pervasive entwinement" test
"extends state-action doctrine beyond its permissible limits." 94
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. Entwinement: Dressed in the Cloak of a Symbiotic
Relationship
"When you use a metaphor, do not mix it up. That is, don't start
by calling something a swordfish and end by calling it an hour-
glass. "1 9
5
Under the traditional theories of state nexus analysis, courts
treated private parties as the state when "the allegedly unconsti-
tutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State."9 6 Criteria
such as coercion, joint action, and agency control evidenced state
action.' 9 Symbiosis differed because the discriminatory acts did
not necessarily spring from the action of the state, but rather
from the interdependent existence of the two parties.' The exis-
tence of a symbiotic relationship between the parties provided
courts with the latitude to consider the state a constructive ac-
tor.'99 Thus, if the parties maintained sufficient contacts, then
"the private individual takes on at least the appearance if not the
actual authority of the state.""'
As employed by the Court in Brentwood, "pervasive entwine-
ment" performed a similar function. Without explicitly defining
"entwinement," the Court held that "'the necessarily fact-bound
inquiry' leads to the conclusion of state action here. The nomi-
nally private character of the Association is overborne by the per-
193. Id. at 314-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. WILLTAM STRUNK JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 81 (3d ed. 1979).
196. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (2000) (emphasis added).
197. See discussion supra Part H.B.1-3.
198. See discussion supra Part II.B.4.
199. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., where the integral nature of the rela-
tionship made the discrimination an "irony amounting to grave injustice." 326 U.S. 715,
724 (1998) (emphasis added).
200. NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 17, § 12.4, at 528.
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vasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in
its composition and workings... ."2o As is evident, the Court did
not rely on the state's coercive acts or joint actions. Rather, the
Court relied on the ostensible action as constructed from a series
of entwined relationships between the state and private par-
ties. 202
A reexamination of the contacts in light of the traditional
nexus theories makes evident a normative justification for the
development of a new test of state action. As stated previously,
entwinement consisted of essentially four contacts: (1) the over-
whelming percentage of public school members in the Association;
(2) the ex officio members from the State Board who served on the
Association's board of control; (3) the Association employees' ac-
cess to state retirement benefits; and (4) the presence of a close
relationship that failed to dissipate after formally separating with
the state.2 °3 Even a cursory overview of the relationships makes
evident a severely overweighted exchange of benefits favoring the
Association. The Court belabored the Association's use of public
facilities and its reliance on the gate receipts of public school
venues and membership dues. °4 Retirement benefits constituted
a significant element evidencing top-down contact between the
parties.20 5 The Court failed to acknowledge the presence of any
state-received benefits, however.20 6 Furthermore, although the
Court borrowed freely from Burton's verbiage when it described
the integral relationship between athletics and secondary public
schools,20 7 it refused to acknowledge its contribution to state ac-
tion analysis-the symbiotic relationship.
201. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
939 (1982)).
202. See discussion supra Part II.B.
203. See id.
204. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 299.
205. Id. at 300.
206. See Respondent's Brief at 21, Brentwood (No. 99-901).
There is no evidence that the state somehow derives monetary benefit, as an
occasional lessor of public property to TSSAA, from TSSAA's enforcement of
its recruiting rule. The mere fact that TSSAA signs a contract with the state
to use a publicly-owned facility for a tournament does not deliver the "symbi-
otic relationship" test to the Petitioner. Otherwise, a one-time lessee of public
property could be sued under § 1983 for any alleged unconstitutional act, re-
gardless of how unrelated that act might be to the lease of public property.
Id.
207. Compare Burton, 364 U.S. at 723-24 ("leased areas... constituted a physically
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The Court's conscious omission of the symbiotic relationship
test is relevant for several reasons. First, although the Court pat-
terned its opinion upon the contacts analysis of Burton and its
progeny,2 it did not employ the symbiosis metaphor. Had the
Court done so, it may have reached the same conclusion as the
dissent-that the state did not profit from the enforcement of the
Association's recruiting rules, and therefore did not constitute a
symbiotic partner of the Association.20 9 Second, it exposed the
Court's furtive reason for the selection of entwinement as a state
action criteria. Just as the Court did not posit a reason why the
case "does not turn on a public function test," it also failed to ad-
dress why the fact-sensitive inquiry precipitated the selection of
entwinement.2' ° The Court merely stated that "examples may be
the best teachers," and then offered four distinguishable cases in
support.211 Clearly, the fact-based restrictions imposed by prece-
dent prevented the majority from reaching its desired conclusion.
By creating a new sub-category of entwinement, the Court freed
itself from this imposition.
B. The Role of Metaphor
"The danger, when judges try to be literary, is not that they will
make pompous fools of themselves .... It is that they will muddy
the law. 2 1
2
For some, the use of metaphor in judicial decision-making is an
analytical necessity.213 In a nomenclature supposedly devoid of
concrete meaning, metaphor provides a "rock-bottom" truth by
which to frame legal argumentation.2 4 Fortunately for a common
law that relies on categorical reasoning and sets of propositional
and financially integral... part of the State's plan .... ."), with Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 299
("Interscholastic athletics obviously play an integral part in the public education of Ten-
nessee.").
208. See cases cited supra note 67.
209. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 311 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 303.
211. Id. at 296-97; see also supra text accompanying notes 152-160.
212. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 279 (revised and enlarged ed. 1998).
213. See Joel R. Cornwell, Legal Writing as a Kind of Philosophy, 48 MERCER L. REV.
1091, 1110 (1997).
214. Id. (quoting CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DESTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 66
(1991)).
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rules, this point of view does not predominate. 215 Nor should it.
The difficulty in delineating precise boundaries to words like
"joint-action," "coercion" and "encouragement" is a justification in
itself. However, another justification that is precipitated by se-
mantic ambiguity is semantic exploitation. By altering the mean-
ing intended by precedent, Brentwood appropriated a seemingly
innocuous metaphor of entwinement as a smell test for state ac-
tion.
As Evans illustrated, the metaphor of entwinement served as
simply that-a metaphor.216 Used to describe the combination of
agency control and symbiotic factors,217 entwinement found little
usage in judicial decision-making since its inception. No subse-
quent Supreme Court decision has relied upon entwinement, and
few have employed the terminology. 21 8 The only majority opinion
after Evans to utilize entwinement in conjunction with state ac-
tion was Gilmore v. City of Montgomery.29 Notwithstanding its
use, the Gilmore Court relied not on entwinement, but on the sin-
gular relationship of a private entity subsidized by the state.220 As
a consequence, the entwinement cited by Brentwood rested upon
almost no precedent, thus making its usage malleable.
However, the Court's usage of metaphor is not limited to "per-
vasive entwinement." Metaphor also constructs the argument,
thus alleviating the necessity for doctrine. Borrowing from Tar-
kanian and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 221 the Court pref-
aced its analysis by stating that the Court has traditionally
"tr[ied] to plot a line between state action.., and private con-
duct."222 "If the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be displaced,"
the Court continued, "its ambit cannot be a simple line between
the States and people operating outside formally governmental
215. See Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under the Color of Law," 91 MICH. L. REV.
323, 331 (1992).
216. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-301 (1966).
217. See supra notes 55-83 and accompanying text.
218. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 472 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 847 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 553 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 566 (1974); Columbia Broad. Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 134 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
219. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
220. See id. at 566.
221. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
222. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295 (emphasis added).
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organizations."2 3 Thus, the Court's line metaphor attempts to
promote judicial discretion by blurring the scope of the inquiry.
Clearly, as Justice O'Connor criticized, the Court has not reached
consistent results in its state action analysis. 224 Nevertheless, the
Court's use of the line metaphor further obscured the already
fuzzy contours of state action as merely "a host of facts," rather
than actual criteria.22' The distinction is significant: whereas "cri-
teria" denotes a "standard of judgment... a rule or principle for
evaluating or testing something,"226 a fact can, of course, be any-
thing. Thus, the line metaphor "liberate[d] the author.., from
the demands of precision and clarity,"22' allowing the latitude to
rely upon a fact such as entwinement.
A more novel literary flourish is the Court's description of "bot-
tom-up" and "top-down" contacts.22' As described earlier, the dis-
tinct approaches represent the state's relationship with the Asso-
ciation as personified by the persons, money, and facilities that
compose the Association, and the personnel and dictates of the
Board that run the Association. 229 Although it is certainly a useful
technique to create the illusion of pervasiveness, the metaphor
bears the unfortunate characteristic of complete artificiality-
giving credence to the contention of some that the contacts analy-
sis is, "in reality, a 'catch all' which may have little, if any, sub-
stantive meaning. "' °
Completing the Court's explication of top-down contacts, the
Court echoed another Evans metaphor-momentum.23' The Court
used "momentum" to elucidate the residual state relationship
that survived the formal legislated separation of the parties.
23 2
This consisted not only of the remaining State Board members
and retirement package, but was confirmed by the continued en-
223. Id.
224. See supra note 8.
225. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296.
226. RANDOM HOUSE DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE-UNABRIDGED 477 (2d
ed. 1993).
227. David A. Anderson, Metaphorical Scholarship, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1205, 1214-15
(1991) (book review).
228. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 288-302.
229. See id.
230. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, § 12.4(b), at 532.
231. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 301.
232. See id.
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forcement of rules and regulations promulgated while under state
control, as well as the State Board's willingness to allow students
to substitute interscholastic activities for their physical education
requirement.2 33 The import of this device was to acknowledge the
"winks and nods" exchanged between the state and the Associa-
tion.2 34 Like Evans, the appearance of state momentum allowed
the Court to circumvent state formalities and discern the under-
lying reality.23  However, the Evans Court found state action
where a municipality transferred ownership to a private trustee
so as to avoid racial desegregation.2 36 The imposition of sanctions
for high school football recruiting violations may not be so nefari-
ous as to justify the disregard of legislative formalism.237
The Court accomplished much by utilization of metaphor.
Through its invention of "pervasive entwinement," it achieved
state action where other criteria of state nexus analysis would not
support it. By erasing an already blurred line of demarcation, it
succeeded in further obfuscating the criteria of state action
analysis so as to avoid the "rigid simplicity" of case precedent. 238
In conceptualizing "bottom-up" and "top-down" contacts, the
Court concocted a new measure of pervasiveness to provide future
jurists the latitude to locate relationships in any number of direc-
tions.2 39 Finally, by incorporating Evans's momentum, the Court
evoked the equity of Brown v. Board of Education4° for a football
coach whose denial of due process consisted of a two-year play-off
suspension.24
V. CONCLUSION: A DECISION OF NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
To anticipate the implications of pervasive entwinement, one
must look no further than the Court's very words: "If Brentwood's
claim were pushing at the edge of the class of possible defendant
state actors, an argument about the social utility of expanding
233. See id. at 299-300.
234. Id. at 301.
235. Id. at 301 n.4.
236. See Evans, 382 U.S. at 301.
237. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 301 n.4 ("[Ihf formalism were the sine qua non of state
action, the doctrine would vanish.").
238. Id. at 295.
239. Id. at 288-302.
240. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
241. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 301.
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that class would at least be on point, but... we are nowhere near
the margin in this case."4 2 To state that the most far-reaching
state action decision since Evans is "nowhere near the margin" of
potential state actors might reveal the extent of the Court's "nor-
mative judgment" regarding the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Indeed, therein lies the social force that continues to ma-
nipulate due process and equal protection-a conception that the
amendment ought to evolve with societal trends and encompass a
more sweeping, undetailed aggregation of potential state ac-
tors .24
Again, this conception is partly forgivable on the grounds that
the doctrine descends from a lamentable age. The utility of such a
state action framework may be evident when one considers the
discrimination committed by states under the guise of a private
entity.24 Nevertheless, such considerations must remain tem-
pered by other values: the need for consistent verdicts, the exclu-
sion of non-meritorious claims, and the avoidance of polemic de-
bate of social issues in the courthouse."4
To suggest, however, that a private athletic association must
not be a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment is
beyond the scope of this writing. It is immaterial to the continued
vitality of the doctrine whether the state received an economic
benefit or whether the actors shared common goals. Rather, what
is significant is that values assigned to words in jurisprudential
discourse remain fixed and consistent in application. The amor-
phous quality of metaphor lends itself to perpetual modification.
Therefore, its usage must be reserved for descriptive rather than
normative purposes. Else, "pervasive entwinement" is little more
than a metaphor for what the Fourteenth Amendment ought to
be, rather than what it is.
Michael A. Culpepper
242. Id. at 304-05 (emphasis added).
243. This notion is perhaps best expressed by Learned Hand, advising that judges
"must be aware of the changing social tensions in every society... which demand new ad-
aptation." William J. Brennan, Jr., Landmarks in Legal Liberty, in THE FOURTEENTH
AmENDMjENT 10 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970). Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. further la-
mented "lw]e know that social realities do not yet correspond with the law of the Four-
teenth Amendment" and sought to "close the gap between promise and fulfillment." Id.
244. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 92-93 (1945) (describing a sheriffs
brutal beating and killing of an African-American man against whom he held a grudge).
245. See Harry J. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1985).
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